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Summary. A formalization of the centralized French Academic Labour Mar-
ket in terms of Multi-Agent System is presented. Extensive simulations are
used to investigate typical and possible regimes of the system, supporting
a sensitivity analysis of the main parameters of the model, such as the ap-
plicative pressure and the preference bias towards local candidates. Based on
the calibration of the parameters of the abstract model after the information
disclosed from official sources, some positive and normative results are pre-
sented. Three prototypical settings are distinguished: the equilibrium setting
corresponds to the perfect market case, where each candidate interacts with
each University; the Humanities and Sciences setting; and the Law and Man-
agement setting. The differences between the last two settings concern both
the applicative pressure (number of candidate per academic position) and the
scope of each candidate (interacting with few or many Universities). Counter-
intuitive findings, related in particular to the role of the preference biases, are
presented and discussed.
1 Introduction
Academic labour markets reflect the historical and cultural specificities
of the country under examination [1]. Whereas the US model is based on
the direct negotiation between candidates and universities, the French
system reflects an egalitarian and centralized tradition, involving global
and local filters (“qualification”, “auditions”, “classement”), followed
by a centralized matching process, analogous to the stable marriage
algorithm [2].
A major concern, expressed e.g., in the French Senate reports [3], is
that the above process might be biased by locality preferences, Univer-
sities tending to recruit their PhD students, which might adversely af-
fect both the fairness and the efficiency of the labour market. While the
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labour market has been analyzed in a sociological [4] or combinatorial
optimization [5] perspective, to our best knowledge, both perspectives
still remain to be integrated in a comprehensive model, sociologically
plausible and operational from an analytical or computational stand-
point.
In this paper, a Multi Agent-based model (MA) of the French aca-
demic labour market is presented and investigated, taking advantage
of the facilities of MA systems to simulate and study multi-step agent-
centered processes [6]. Some positive and normative lessons are re-
ported. based on extensive simulations calibrated after empirical data.
In particular, a saturation regime is characterized, where efficiency and
fairness happen to be antagonistic objectives.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the state
of the art and presents the goals of the study. A MA-based model of
the French academic labour market is described in section 3. Section 4
relates this model to the empirical data, and proposes some assessment
criteria. Section 5 reports on the lessons learned from extensive simula-
tions, interpreting the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters of the
model and discussing the possible remedies to the saturation regimes.
The paper concludes with some perspectives for further research.
2 Related work and Goal of the study
Universities and academic labour markets can be seen as complex sys-
tems [7]. Extreme types of academic labour market are the decentral-
ized American system, on the one hand, and the centralized French
system, on the other hand. The former system has been investigated
using e.g. Data Mining tools to study the hiring network [8], showing a
highly centralized and directed career path toward the best universities.
The latter system has been investigated in a sociological perspective by
[4], focusing on the cognitive (quality assessment), organizational (team
relationships, university organization) and societal (scientific and pro-
fessional market impacts) aspects of the hiring process.
Centralized labour markets can also be viewed as combinatorial op-
timization problem, pairing the candidates and the positions. While the
algorithm used by the French ministry to compute the actual pairing is
unknown, it is essentially the same as the one presented by [5]. Given
the preference order of each candidate/University, the algorithm con-
structs an optimal matching, in the sense that every affectation swap
improving the situation of one candidate, would deteriorate the situa-
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tion of at least another candidate1. The setting is “truthful” [9] in the
sense that no agent could improve his lot by lying about his prefer-
ences. Note however that the above results consider ideal situations, in
particular, with infinite numbers of candidates/Universities.
The goal of the study is to investigate the properties of the multi-
step negotiation/matching process involved in the French academic
labour market, within a bounded rationality perspective (limited num-
ber of candidates/Universities, cognitive limitations, preference biases
and random noise).
The chosen modelling framework is based on Multi-Agent Systems,
with the following rationale. On the one hand, MAS offer convenient
simulation environments, amenable to the extensive study of social sys-
tems, like ModuleEco [10] and RePast [11], offering implementation,
script and visualization facilities.
On the other hand, the main difficulty of the approach is to build an
operational and realistic model. Various studies related to social sys-
tems have emphasized the flexibility of MAS-based modelling [12, 6].
For instance, [13] and [14] respectively use MAS to simulate stadium
evacuation or pedestrian flow. Both propose a model for the agents,
the environment and the interactions, and calibrate them using em-
pirical data. They further demonstrate the ability of MAS modelling
to sustain positive and normative objectives, respectively explaining
emerging phenomena and suggesting/assessing some changes in the in-
teraction rules or in the parameters of the system. For these reasons,
a simplified model of the French ALM in terms of Multi-Agent System
will be used in this paper.
3 A Centralized Labour Market
This section first briefly describes the French academic labour market,
and details the proposed abstraction thereof.
3.1 In Practice
The actual procedure involves a sequence of steps:
1. The would-be candidates send an application file to a central
agency, that decides whether the candidate is admissible (“quali-
fication”).
1 While the algorithm gives the priority to the candidate preferences, it is clear
that the roles of candidates and Universities are symmetrical during the matching
phase.
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2. Twice a year, the ministry publishes open positions in French uni-
versities.
3. Admissible candidates can apply for these positions; there is no
restriction on the number of applications of any candidate.
4. For each position, a jury (“commission de specialistes”) decides
whether an actual candidate will be interviewed (“auditions”).
5. Every candidate decides whether he will pass the interview (e.g.
as the interviews for some jobs in the South/the North of France
might be scheduled on the same day, the candidate cannot attend
both).
6. For each position, the jury produces a shortlist of (at most) 5 per-
sons, subset of the actually interviewed candidates. A candidate in
this list is “shortlisted”.
7. Candidates are informed about their rank for each position they
have applied to, and produce their preference order (among the
positions for which they are shortlisted).
8. The ordered preferences of the Universities and candidates are used
to automatically compute an effective matching.
3.2 The model
The proposed model involves two types of agents, the candidates Ci
and the Universities Uj . A simplifying assumption (supported by the
empirical evidence on average) is that each University offers a single
position. Furthermore, the rest of the paper uses as working hypothesis
the existence of a total order on the candidates, on the one hand,
and on the Universities, on the other hand. The rank of candidate Ci
(University Uj) is respectively noted ρ(Ci) (resp. ρ(Uj)) or ρ(i), ρ(j)
when no ambiguity arises. The spatialization of the candidates and the
Universities is modelled through a distance matrix d(Ci, Uj), meant as
the distance between Uj and the University where Ci passed his PhD,
referred to as home University.
Candidate agent
Candidate Ci is characterized from i) his global rank ρ(i); ii) his
“elitism” ei or bias toward the best universities; iii) his locality ℓi,
or bias toward the universities nearest to his home University; iv) his
degree of subjectivity si, modelled as the weight of a random variable
V , uniformly drawn in [0, 1]; v) his risk-taking orientation ri; vi) the
number Ni of positions he will applied to; vii) the probability hi of
applying to his home University.
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These characteristics together determine his personal ranking of the
Universities2:
P (Ci, Uj) = ei ×
ρ(j)
#U
+ ℓi × d(Ci, Uj) + siV
Based on this preference order, Ci must first decide the positions (≡
the Universities) he will apply to. This decision depends on whether Ci
is risk-adverse or risk-taker, modelled through risk parameter ri:
S(Ci, Uj) = riP (Ci, Uj) + (1− ri)×
|ρ(i)− ρ(j)|
#C
(1)
A risk-adverse candidate Ci will discard the Universities deemed too
good (or too bad) to match his own status. Risk-taker Ci will instead
consider his personal preference order only. The normalization by the
number #C of candidates and the number #U of universities ensures
that both terms vary in [0, 1].
Finally, Ci applies to the first Ni Universities after order S(Ci, Uj);
additionally, with probability hi, Ci will apply to his home University.
Universities and positions
As mentioned earlier on, each University offers a single job; no distinc-
tion is thus made between positions and Universities. University Uj is
characterized by i) its rank ρ(j); ii) its “elitism” ej , or bias toward
the best candidates; iii) its locality ℓj , or bias toward local candidates;
iv) its degree of subjectivity sj (modelled as the weight of a random
variable V uniformly drawn in [0,1]); v) its risk-taking orientation rj ;
vi) the number Nj of candidates it will interview, uniformly selected
in some [a, b] interval depending on the setting considered (section 4);
vii) its strategy hj toward local candidates.
The main difference between the preferences of Universities and can-
didates regards the locality bias. In Eq. (1), the local bias of candidate
Ci toward University Uj is expressed additively as term ℓid(Ci, Uj); the
local bias of University Uj is instead expressed multiplicatively:
P (Uj , Ci) =


(ej ×
ρ(i)
#C
+ sjV )× ℓj if Ci is local, d(Ci, Uj) = 0
ej ×
ρ(i)
#C
+ sjV otherwise
2 Note that term siV could as well model the cognitive impairment of the candidate,
e.g. under/over estimating the University ranks.
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Based on its preference order, Uj likewise decides which candidates will
be interviewed (among candidates applying to Uj), filtered through its
risk-taking orientation, where #C indicates the number of candidates:
S(Uj , Ci) = rj × P (Uj , Ci) + (1− rj)×
|ρ(j)− ρ(i)|
#C
(2)
Uj will interview the Nj first candidates after order S(Uj , Ci); indepen-
dently, local candidates will be interviewed with probability hj .
Interaction rules
Every candidate Ci applies for the Ni job positions selected, Ni be-
ing uniformly selected in [1,MaxApplication] interval depending on
the setting considered (section 4); every University Uj ranks the appli-
cants and interviews the first Nj of them, Nj being bounded by some
global threshold MaxInterviews, depending on the setting. Universities
thereafter produces a shortlist of (at most) MaxShortList candidates.
Candidates thereafter disclose their preferences among the Universities
where they appear on the shortlist. Eventually, the preferences of can-
didates and Universities are processed by a combinatorial optimization
algorithm [5] to produce a global matching.
4 Experimental setting
Our model was implemented using the RePast framework [11]. The
ground truth is described in section 4.1 and used to calibrate the pa-
rameters of the model. Observed variables are discussed in section 4.2
and section 4.3 describes the goal of the experiments.
4.1 Ground truth and Parameter Calibration
Universities are uniformly distributed in a rectangular 2D domain.
Home university of candidates are uniformly distributed among uni-
versities.
Other quantitative parameters values are calibrated after empirical
data published by the French ministry [15]. The positions are labelled
after their scientific disciplines (57), which are regrouped into three
fields: Law, Economics & Management (L&M), Literature & Humani-
ties (H) and Sciences (S) (see Tab. 2 of App. A).
Empirical data show that the first field (L&M) significantly differs
from the other two e.g. regarding the average number of applications
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of candidates (above 25 in L&M vs less than 10 in other fields) and
selection pressure (2 admissible candidates for 1 position in L&M vs
4 in other fields). Accordingly, three typical situations (modeled after
three parameter settings) have been modelled and investigated in our
simulations (Table 1):
• The perfect market setting is when every candidate applies in every
university, and every university interviews every candidate. Elitism
is set to 1 and both universities and candidates are risk taker (risk
is set to 1). A ”mild” perfect market setting (perfect50rdm) dif-
fers from the above as the elitism parameter is set to 0.5 and the
subjective (random) factor is set to 0.5.
• The H&S setting reflects the empirical data with #U =50, #C=200
and MaxApplication=20. Preference parameters were inspired from
statistical studies reporting a high bias toward the quality??. Sim-
ulations showed a posteriori a good agreement with the observed
variables (see below), and the good stability of the model wrt the
parameter values in the considered ranges.
• The L&M setting only differs from the H&S setting in the number
of candidates (100) and maximum number of applications (50).
Each result for the parameter sensibility analysis is the average over
200 simulations with same deterministic parameter values and inde-
pendent stochastic parameter values.
For the sake of robustness, some agent parameters are defined as
random uniform variables; notation U [a; b] indicates that a random
variable uniformly selected in interval [a, b].
4.2 Observed variables
The choice of the observed variables was guided after two criteria: the
fact that the information has to be officially disclosed for validation
purpose, and its relevance to assess qualitatively and quantitatively
the global efficiency of the ALM.
The first two variables are the number of positions fulfilled (Recruit-
mentRate) and the number of positions fulfilled by local candidates (Lo-
calRecruitmentRate). On the one hand these observations are officially
disclosed at the discipline level; on the other hand RecruitmentRate
definitely characterizes the efficiency of the hiring process, and Re-
cruitmentRate corresponds to a very controversial qualitative aspect.
The ALM can actually be viewed as a multi-objective optimization
problem; while the main criterion is to maximize the RecruitmentRate,
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Perfect H&S L&M
General N. candidates #C 100 200 100
N. universities #U 100 50 50
MaxShortList 100 5 5
Candidate N. applications Ni 100 U[1;20] U[1;50]
Elitism ei 1 .7 .7
Locality ℓi 0 .1 .1
Risk ri 1 U[.1; 1] U[.1;1]
Applying home hi 1 1 1
University N. interviews Nj 100 15 15
Elitism ej 1 .7 .7
Locality ℓj 1 U[1;1.2] U[1;1.2]
Risk rj 1 U[.1;1] U[.1;1]
Interview local hj 1 1 1
Table 1. Parameters of the model
a secondary criterion might be to bound (or even to minimize) the
LocalRecruitmentRate.
Two additional variables will be considered, which also character-
ize the efficiency and fairness of the ALM: the rank of the last hired
candidate, noted LastAccepted (the higher, the better) and the rank of
the first candidate which is not hired, noted FirstRejected (the lower
FirstRejected the better). Although these observations cannot be com-
pared to the “ground truth” for obvious reasons, they are available
through simulations. They qualify the ALM process, and can be in-
terpreted as type I and II errors in discrimination tasks: LastAccepted
corresponds to type I errors (high LastAccepted values suggest that
some hired candidates should actually have been rejected); symmet-
rically, FirstRejected corresponds to type II errors (low FirstRejected
values suggest that some rejected candidates should actually have been
hired). The optimal situation clearly is when LastAccepted is the num-
ber of jobs, and FirstRejected= LastAccepted+ 1.
4.3 Goals of the study
Our goal is to analyze the French ALM with respect to the typical
situations described in section 4.1, along three perspectives: positive
(explain the observed variables); normative (examine the effects of rule
modifications); and computational (sensitivity of the system w.r.t. the
parameter settings).
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The computational analysis will primarily consider the perfect mar-
ket case, assessing its efficiency and robustness with respect to the
candidate and University models.
Secondly, the behaviour of the model will be discussed and com-
pared to the empirical evidence (ground truth); the influence of the
model parameters will be discussed along a sensitivity analysis, and
some interpretations will be proposed. Lastly, some modifications of
the process (concerning the selective pressure, the threshold on the
size of the shortlists, and the constraints about local candidates) will
be investigated and their global effects on the ALM will be analyzed.
5 Experimental study
This section reports on the behaviour of the ALM model within all three
settings respectively describing the perfect market case, the Humanity
and Science (H&S) case, and the Law and Management (L&M) case.
5.1 Perfect Market Setting
The perfect market setting, used as a sanity check to investigate the
properties of the dynamic system in the complete information case, as-
sumes that each candidate applies to each position and is interviewed.
As shown in Fig. 1.(a), the efficiency of the market is governed by the
threshold MaxShortList on the maximal size of the shortlists; since all
Universities compete for the best candidates, a tiny fraction of the can-
didates only is actually hired and RecruitmentRate remains low. Ran-
dom perturbations, e.g. high subjective preference weights (si = sj = .5,
Fig. 1.(b)) significantly improve the efficiency of the labour market,
while the number LocalRecruitmentRate of successful local candidates
remains low. These results suggest that, under an optimal matching
process, Universities and candidates should either deviate from the sin-
gle elitism based order, using subjective biases or risk-adverse filters −
or relax the upper bound on the number of candidates shortlisted by
Universities, and have MaxShortList be unbounded.
5.2 Humanity and Sciences Setting
The behaviour of the model closely follows the ground truth; the aver-
age RecruitmentRate amounts to 98% of the job positions and Local-
RecruitmentRate to 28% against respectively 94% and 28% disclosed
from official sources.
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Fig. 1. Perfect Market: Influence of MaxShortList on RecruitmentRate and
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Fig. 2. H&S Setting: Sensitivity Analysis of the Candidate parameters (top)
and University parameters (bottom).
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The sensitivity analysis of the model parameters is reported in Fig.
2. The RecruitmentRate is close to 100% in all settings, and only de-
pends on the maximum number of applications for the candidates. Ac-
tually, if candidates apply to many universities, the same saturation
phenomenon as in the perfect case is observed; Universities tend to
select the same candidates and eventually some job positions are not
fulfilled.
The LocalRecruitmentRate depends as expected on the weight of the
local preferences. Interestingly, the only fact that candidates always
apply to their home University (hi = 1), everything else being equal,
increases the LocalRecruitmentRate from 8% to 28%. In the particular
case where Universities and candidates have no preference toward local
candidates/Universities (ℓi = ℓj = 1, hj = 0), the fact that candidates
systematically apply to their home Universities increases LocalRecruit-
mentRate from 2% to 15% (Fig. 3); in the meanwhile, this is found to
improve both LastAccepted and FirstRejected.
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Fig. 3. H&S Setting: When candidates systematically apply to their home
University, and Universities/Candidates have no local preference bias
Surprisingly, the fact that Universities always interview the local
candidates does not make any difference on LocalRecruitmentRate; and
the number of interviewed candidates makes no difference either. An
interpretation of this counterintuitive result is that interviews do not
bring any additional information in the proposed model, hence do not
perturb the prior preferences of the Universities.
The efficiency and fairness of the process, as regarding LastAccepted
and FirstRejected, are clearly under-optimal (being reminded that the
optimal situation is for LastAccepted=50 and FirstRejected=51 in the
experimental setting). Furthermore, candidate and university parame-
ters do not allow per se to improve the efficiency or fairness of the mar-
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ket. Increasing the elitism weight will obviously improve LastAccepted,
but at the expense of the RecruitmentRate. While increasing the num-
ber of applications of the candidates does improve LastAccepted and
FirstRejected, a closer inspection reveals that this improvement only
results from the lesser RecruitmentRate.
Modifying the market rules: efficient and inefficient
modifications.
As mentioned earlier on, MAS enable the fast modelling and simulation
of alternative models. Alternative models of the ALM have thus been
investigated (Fig. 4). Forbidding the interview of local candidates has
an overall positive impact; while RecruitmentRate remains high (96%
as opposed to 98%), FirstRejected significantly increases. Increasing
the number of candidates (e.g. relaxing the “qualification filter”, see
section 3.1) does not make any difference in the considered range (about
200 candidates for 50 positions). Significantly increasing the number of
candidates decreases the RecruitmentRate, after the same saturation
phenomenon observed in the perfect market case.
Note also that relaxing the constraint on MaxShortList does not
make any difference, suggesting that the selective pressure in the H&
S labour market is appropriate.
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Fig. 4. H&S setting; Impact of increasing MaxShortList, increasing the num-
ber of candidates, or forbidding the interview of local candidates.
5.3 Law & Management Setting
In the L&M context, using the same preference settings as in the H&S
context with a lower selective pressure (100 candidates for 50 posi-
tions) and a higher exploration of the candidates (applying to 50%
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universities on average), produces results significantly different from
the ground truth (Fig. 5), with RecruitmentRate=70% and LocalRe-
cruitmentRate=5.5% (instead of respectively 94% and 37%). Further,
the behaviour of the model is stable with respect to slight modifications
of the parameter values.
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Fig. 5. L&M Setting: Sensitivity Analysis of the Candidate parameters (top)
and University parameters (bottom).
The low RecruitmentRate value is blamed on the saturation of the
system, akin the perfect market case. Although the L&M setting in-
volves less candidates than the H&S setting, these apply to more Uni-
versities; as Universities tend to select the same candidates, the number
of positions eventually fulfilled decreases. Only two strategies have been
found to overcome this saturation phenomenon: a high bias toward lo-
cal candidates, or strong subjective preferences, modelled as a high
weight of the random factor (incidentally degrading the LastAccepted
and FirstRejected indicators). Computationally, a good match with the
ground truth was obtained using high weights for the local and subjec-
tive preference bias.
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After the above remarks, the L&M labour market does require high
preference biases, based on locality or other information, to enforce an
efficient RecruitmentRate. Nepotism thus appears to be a rational strat-
egy, rather than some “bad habit” of Faculty members in the domain
of Law and Management.
Clearly, the risk aversion might play a similar role: if Universities
and candidates are risk-adverse and interview candidates/apply to Uni-
versities whose rank match their own, the RecruitmentRate also signif-
icantly increases. In practice however, University and candidate ranks
are not publicly disclosed; risk aversion alone might thus be insufficient
to overcome the saturation phenomenon.
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Fig. 6. L&M setting; Impact of increasing MaxShortList, increasing the num-
ber of candidates, or forbidding the interview of local candidates.
Complementary investigations (Fig. 6) show that relaxing the MaxShort-
List parameter would enforce an efficient labour market (Recruitmen-
tRate=94% for MaxShortList=10, 99% for MaxShortList=15). Quite
the contrary, increasing the number of candidates and/or forbidding
candidates to apply in their home University would not in itself ad-
dress the saturation problem.
6 Conclusion and Perspectives
The simplified model of the French Academic Labour Market proposed
in this paper was investigated along intensive simulations of the corre-
sponding Multi-Agent System.
A saturation phenomenon was observed, in both the perfect market
case, and in the L&M case. The proposed interpretation is the following.
The stronger the elitism of candidates (respectively, Universities), the
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more they tend to apply to the best Universities (resp., shortlist best
candidates); when the University shortlists strongly overlap, only the
best candidates are hired, and most job positions remain unfulfilled.
The reason why the saturation is not observed in the H&S case, despite
a stronger pressure (4 candidates for a job instead of 2), might be the
fact that H&S candidates apply to significantly less Universities (10 on
average, vs 25 in the L&M case). The higher diversity of the candidate
pools in diverse Universities, contributes to a better efficiency of the
Academic Labour Market.
The saturation faced by L&M Universities makes it necessary to
use strategies to diversify their candidate pools. Risk-adverse strategies
(e.g., only interviewing candidates whose rank matches the University
status) would fix the saturation problem; however, the prior knowledge
about the ranks (of Universities and candidates) might be too limited
to enable efficient risk-adverse strategies.
Secondly, the LocalRecruitmentRate was thoroughly investigated in
relation with the candidate and University models. It has been shown
that, assuming that the Universities have no preference toward the lo-
cal candidates, the only fact that candidates systematically apply to
their home University, explains half the LocalRecruitmentRate.
Independently, localism was found to be a rational strategy in the satu-
ration case, to enforce the diversity of the candidate pool and eventually
ensure that the job positions will actually be fulfilled.
Another important lesson learned is that the main constraint be-
hind the saturation phenomenon is the MaxShortList; according to the
simulations, relaxing this constraint is by far the most effective way
of overcoming the saturation problem. Indeed, the longer the shortlist,
the more demanding the task of the University jury (“commission de
spcialistes”) is.
Further research will improve the proposed model of the Academic
Labour Market along the following directions. Firstly, the modelling of
the rank effects will be refined to account for the fact that ranks are at
best fuzzily estimated. In particular the “optimism/pessimism” of can-
didates and Universities will be modelled as they over-estimate/under-
estimate their own rank, and accordingly adopt a risk-taking/risk
adverse strategy. Secondly, an “iterated game” version of the ALM
will be studied, investigating the relative benefits or costs of opti-
mism/pessimism. One wonders whether one key principle in game the-
ory, the “optimism in the face of uncertainty”, holds in the considered
context.
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Appendix
A Empirical data
Table 2. Empirical data for the three fields and total
2007 first procedure Total Law & Man. Literature Science
Candidates 9318 555 3135 5540
Applications 76900 14896 27687 32986
Jobs 2110 324 695 1000
nbApp/job 36,4 46,0 39,8 33,0
nbApp/cand 8,3 26,8 8,8 6,0
nbCand/Job 4,4 1,7 4,5 5,5
RecruitmentRate 98% 94% 99% 99%
No hire Cand choice 37 17 8 12
No hire No cand 6 1 2 3
LocalRecruitmentRate 28% 37% 24% 28%
nbSection 57 6 25 23
Avg. nbJob / section 37,0 54,0 27,8 43,5
Only the total number of candidate was available in official data.
The number of candidate for each field is deduced from the part of
newly qualified hired candidates and from the total number of newly
qualified people.
The total column is not equal to the sum of the three fields because
they do not include the pharmacy sections.
